USA v. Lane by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-14-2009 
USA v. Lane 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Lane" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 818. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/818 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,




Appeal from the United States District Court
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
No. 04-cr-00697-2
(District Judge: The Honorable William H. Yohn) 
___________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 2, 2009
Before: McKEE, HARDIMAN, and GREENBERG Circuit Judges
(Filed August 14, 2009) 
2OPINION OF THE COURT
McKee, Circuit Judge,
Steven Lane appeals his conviction for conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce
by robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
I. 
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we
need not recite the factual or procedural history.  Lane argues that the district court erred in
permitting a government witness to testify about Lane’s involvement in a prior robbery for which
he had been neither charged nor convicted.  He contends that this testimony was irrelevant and
that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and that he is therefore entitled
to a new trial under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  We disagree.  
We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion.  United
States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001).  Rule 404(b) states that while “[e]vidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
conformity therewith,” such evidence may be used for other purposes.  Indeed, such evidence
shall be admitted  “if relevant for any other purpose than to show a mere propensity or
disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.”  United States v. Long, 574 F.2d
761, 766 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978).  
In order to be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must meet four requirements: (1) it
must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) it must be relevant; (3) its probative value must not be
substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial impact; and (4) the court must properly
3instruct the jury about the proper use and relevance of the evidence.  See Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988).  See also United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir.
2003).  
During argument on the motion to introduce this evidence the government explained that
the testimony about the prior robbery was necessary to establish the ongoing relationship of Lane
with his co-defendant, the government’s witness.  The testimony explained why Lane and the co-
defendant trusted each other and were able to accomplish the robbery in question without
significant planning.  The evidence was therefore relevant to establishing preparation and plan
which are appropriate uses of evidence of a defendant’s prior “bad acts” under Rule 404(b). 
Moreover, this testimony was the only way the government could establish the relationship
between Lane and the co-defendant, and that was certainly relevant to the government’s case. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly found that a “genuine need” for the evidence outweighed
any prejudicial effect.  (App. 61-62).  
We have held in numerous cases that evidence of prior criminal activity is admissible
under Rule 404(b) to show the relationship between a witness and a defendant.  See, e.g., United
States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2001) (allowing witness in pharmaceutical theft case to
testify as to defendant’s prior participation in identical theft); see also United States v. Simmons,
679 F.2d 1042, 1050 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134 (1983) (holding that evidence
may be introduced “to provide necessary background information, to show an ongoing
relationship between [the defendant and a co-conspirator], and to help the jury understand the co-
conspirator’s role in the scheme”). 
In addition, the district court gave an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury that
4minimized the likelihood that the evidence would be considered for an improper purpose.  See
United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 748 (3d Cir. 1996).  Our review is for plain error because
Lane did not object to this testimony at trial. United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 265 (3d Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 821 (2002).  Given the district court’s limiting instruction, and the
relevance of the evidence under Rule 404(b), we find no error at all in admitting this evidence, let
alone any “plain error.”  The instruction was given both at the time of the testimony, and again
before the jury deliberated.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury did not
understand the instructions or were incapable of following them.  
Although Lane cites several cases to support his argument that the instructions were
insufficient to overcome the prejudicial effect of the testimony, all of the cases he cites involve
situations where there was either no proper purpose for the evidence, or the court simply failed to
give any limiting instruction at all.  Here, “we believe this is a case where the jury could be
expected to compartmentalize the evidence and consider it for its proper purposes.”  Sriyuth, 98
F.3d at 748.  
II.
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.
